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INTRODUCTION
Genetically modified (GM) plants—also known as genetically
modified organisms (GMOs), transgenic crops, or the product of
recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology—were introduced in the commercial
marketplace in 1996.1 Since then, the global surface area planted in such
crops has been increasing annually at a growth rate of more than ten
percent.2 Twenty-five countries planted GM crops in 2008, a significant
increase from the six countries that started out in 1996.3 This rapid growth
shows no sign of slowing down.4 The total accumulated global area covered
by biotechnology (biotech) crops between 1996 and 2008 has now
surpassed two billion acres, and while it took ten years to reach the first

Copyright © 2011 by Rebecca Jesada
 Rebecca Jesada is a 2010 graduate of the University of Maryland School of Law and a health
law certificate recipient. The author gratefully acknowledges the editorial staff of the Journal of
Health Care Law & Policy for their help with this Comment, as well as her family for their
support throughout her academic career.
1. Yong Gao, Biosafety Issues, Assessment, and Regulation of Genetically Modified Food
Plants, in THE GMO HANDBOOK 297, 298 (Sarad R. Parekh ed., 2004).
2. Id.
3. International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, ISAAA Brief 392008 Executive Summary,
http://www.isaaa.org/Resources/Publications/briefs/39/executivesummary/default.html (last
visited Apr. 19, 2011).
4. See id. (providing compiled statistics on the growth of commercial biotechnology crops
and farmers around the world from 1996 to 2008).
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billion acre milestone,5 it took only three years to hit the second billion.6
Amidst this global surge, the U.S. is by far the leading grower of GM
crops.7 Herbicide-tolerant soybean and insect-resistant corn are two of the
most common GM crops in the U.S.8 These products are now ubiquitous in
the American food supply: as much as eighty-five percent of corn and
ninety-one percent of soybeans in this country may be genetically
engineered (GE).9 Up to seventy percent of processed foods found in the
grocery store contain such ingredients.10 Because the existing regulatory
framework does not require manufacturers to disclose these components on
their labels,11 these foods are making their way to the American dinner
table without the knowledge of consumers. Though GM products have been
available for thirteen years, and though they fall under the purview of three
different federal agencies (the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA)),12 the policy debate surrounding appropriate
regulatory measures is ongoing.13
A. Defining GMOs and the Stakeholders
Biotechnology has been defined as the application of ―scientific
principles to living organisms and their components to produce new
inventions or processes.‖14 More specifically, GM crops result from the use
of rDNA technology enabling the insertion of genes from one species into
another in order to produce desirable traits, such as pesticide resistance.15
These combinations could not occur under traditional breeding
procedures.16 Due to the genetic engineering process, it is thought that GM

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Gao, supra note 1, at 298.
9. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, GE FOOD, http://truefoodnow.org/campaigns/geneticallyengineered-foods/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2011).
10. Id.
11. See infra, Part I.B.1.
12. See infra, Part I.A.1.
13. Matthew Rich, The Debate Over Genetically Modified Crops in the United States:
Reassessment of Notions of Harm, Difference, and Choice, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 889, 889
(2004).
14. W. Christopher Matton & F. Scott Thomas, The Continuing Balance: Federal Regulation
of Biotechnology, 44 JURIMETRICS 283, 284 (2004).
15. Doug Farquhar & Liz Meyer, State Authority to Regulate Biotechnology Under the
Federal Coordinated Framework, 12 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 439, 441 (2007).
16. Id.
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foods could pose unique health, environmental, agricultural,17 and
economic consequences.18 Thus, the stakeholders in this debate tend to be
consumer advocacy groups, health-related entities, and environmental and
organic farming organizations on the one hand, versus the powerful
biotechnology industry and government regulators on the other.19 This
Comment will focus primarily on the human health perspective rather than
environmental and agricultural risks.20 Cloned meat sources and other
forms of GM crops, such as those developed for pharmaceutical purposes,
are beyond the scope of this analysis.
B. Biotechnology Policy Principles: Regulating out Vs. Regulating in
An overarching theme throughout any discussion of biotechnology is
whether it is more appropriate to assume that a new development is safe or
unsafe until proven otherwise. The approach of the European Union (EU)
has been consistent with the latter21 and in general, the Precautionary
Principle.22 This concept holds that government has a duty to intervene or
regulate where there is even a possibility of harm to the public health or the
environment.23 The United States takes the opposite perspective, that
―GMOs should be permitted to flourish in the absence of proven hazards.‖24
17. See generally Rich, supra note 13, at 895–900 (describing the effects of GMO use on the
environment and agriculture, such as a potential decrease in biodiversity).
18. See Jim Chen, Lecture, Beyond Food and Evil, 56 DUKE L.J. 1581, 1582 (2007) (noting
the risk that economic pressure to produce GMOs could put farmers who are already under
financial strain out of business).
19. See, e.g., Michael Jacobson, Opinion-Editorial, The Genetically Modified Food Fight, 172
W. J. MED. 220, 220 (2000) (arguing on behalf of the Center for Science in the Public Interest that
additional testing and regulation of GMOs is needed). See also Gregory N. Mandel, Technology
Wars: The Failure of Democratic Discourse, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 117, 134
(2005) (pointing out that in the debate over biotechnology, ―polarization and deadlock lead each
group to focus on opposition and preventing the other side from achieving its goals, rather than
searching for and pursuing mutually beneficial outcomes‖ and noting that mutually beneficial
solutions tend to ―receive minimal attention from interest groups, the media, and the public‖).
20. See infra, Part II.
21. Thomas J. Moyer & Stephen P. Anway, Biotechnology and the Bar: A Response to the
Growing Divide Between Science and the Legal Environment, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 671, 695
(2007).
22. Rich, supra note 13, at 901.
23. Id.
24. Moyer & Anway, supra note 21, at 695. At the same time, some scholars believe it is an
oversimplification to state that the EU follows the precautionary principle, while the U.S. rejects
it. See, e.g., John D. Graham, The Perils of the Precautionary Principle: Lessons from the
American and European Experience, HERITAGE LECTURES (Jan. 15, 2004), available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/The-Perils-of-the-Precautionary-Principle-Lessonsfrom-the-American-and-European-Experience (arguing that it is a ―fallacy‖ to categorize the EU
as precautionary and the U.S. as the opposite because there is no unified concept behind the
―precautionary principle‖ and both countries utilize precautionary stances toward regulation in
different ways).
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The precautionary principle derives originally from German environmental
policy in the 1970‘s, and has since come to inform many international
treaties and protocols, such as the United Nations Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety.25 The Protocol authorized member states to apply the
precautionary principle by regulating or banning GMOs where there is
scientific uncertainty about their risks.26 The EU has viewed GMOs with an
inherent distrust, imposing a strict regulatory scheme beginning in 1998,27
which effectively banned products containing GMOs by refusing to approve
them for sale.28 The resulting moratorium on the import of American
agricultural products created with genetic engineering, particularly corn, has
been a source of dispute between the U.S. and the EU ever since and has
cost the U.S. at least three hundred million dollars according to some
estimates.29 In 2003, the U.S., Argentina, and Canada filed a complaint
against the EU with the World Trade Organization (WTO), arguing that the
de facto ban violated international trade rules.30 The EU ended the
moratorium to some extent the following year by approving an American
variety of GE corn, but only after member states were unable to reach a
decision for or against approval.31 In May 2006, the WTO issued a final
ruling that found the EU ban to be in violation of several trade
25. Michael Pollan, The Year in Ideas: A to Z; Precautionary Principle, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9,
2001, at 92.
26. Debra M. Strauss, Feast or Famine: The Impact of the WTO Decision Favoring the U.S.
Biotechnology Industry in the EU Ban of Genetically Modified Foods, 45 AMER. BUS. L.J. 775,
815 (2008). The Director of the Trade and Agriculture Project at the Institute for Agriculture and
Trade Policy has described the impact of the Cartagena Protocol as follows:
There is already a broad international consensus on how to handle GE crops
at the international level established at the Cartagena Protocol. This
consensus acknowledges that each country has the right to regulate GE crops
based on precautionary principles, to require labeling of GE crops, and to
protect farmers and others from unfair liability arising from the release of GE
crops into the environment and food distribution system.
Press Release, Inst. for Agric. & Trade Policy, WTO Ruling on Genetically Engineered Crops
Would Override International, National, and Local Protections (Feb. 7, 2006),
http://www.iatp.org/iatp/library/admin/uploadedfiles/WTO_Ruling_on_Genetically_Engineered_
Crops_Wou.pdf.
27. Strauss, supra note 26, at 780 (―U.S. consumers appear to be less aware of the potential
risks and more trusting of their regulatory agencies; Europeans are more risk averse to the human
health and safety issues associated with GM food products.‖).
28. Justin Gillis & Paul Blustein, WTO Ruling Backs Biotech Crops; European Ban,
Challenged by U.S. and Allies, Violates Trade Regulations, Panel Says, WASH. POST, Feb. 8,
2006, at D01 (noting that the ban occurred from 1998 until 2004).
29. Strauss, supra note 26, at 781–82 (citing RAYMOND J. AHEARN, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, TRADE CONFLICT AND THE U.S.-EUROPEAN UNION ECONOMIC
RELATIONSHIP 19 (2007), available at
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL30732.pdf).
30. Id. at 775.
31. Id. at 808.
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regulations.32 How to correctly interpret this complex decision has been a
source of ongoing controversy since then, and its impact remains unclear.33
Biotechnology companies would like the world to view the ruling as ―an
unequivocal endorsement of GM foods,‖34 while others note the continued
resistance among European consumers35 and the fact that few GM products
have actually been approved by the EU since the moratorium was lifted in
2004.36
Amidst this international landscape of uncertainty, it becomes more
urgent to ask whether the U.S. is taking the appropriate approach to
regulating GMOs within its borders. This Comment will explore the risks
that flow from rejecting the Precautionary Principle, beginning with an
examination of the existing regulatory framework for GMO labeling within
the U.S. and the rationale for current FDA policy.37 Not only are the longterm health risks of GMOs unknown,38 but there are many known, potential
consequences associated with their integration into the food supply, such as
increased allergenicity,39 toxicity,40 and antibiotic resistance.41 The debate
surrounding labeling of GMOs has often resulted in polarized arguments,
with GMO proponents arguing against a labeling requirement on one end,
and GMO opponents arguing for a total ban on the other.42 The
implementation of a mandatory labeling requirement is a moderate solution
to bridge this gap; without banning GMOs altogether, such a requirement
would at least enable consumer awareness and choice and encourage the
pursuit of additional research.43 After addressing the legal insufficiency of a

32. Id. at 776.
33. For a detailed discussion of the ruling, see id. at 785-806.
34. Id. at 806-07.
35. Id. at 807.
36. Foreign Agricultural Service: U.S. Mission to the European Union, Biotechnology,
http://www.fas.usda.gov/posthome/useu/GMOs.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2011). According to the
Foreign Agricultural Service U.S. Mission to the European Union, just nine products resulting
from biotechnology have been approved for marketing in the EU since May 2004. Id. See also
Strauss, supra note 26, at 808 (noting that of the more than forty-seven biotechnology products
awaiting EU approval since the lifting of the moratorium, several have been delayed in the review
process for over six years, in stark contrast to the typical six to nine month process in the U.S.,
Canada, and Japan).
37. See infra, Part I.A.1.
38. See infra, Part II.A.4.
39. See infra, Part II.A.1.
40. See infra, Part II.A.2.
41. See infra, Part II.A.3.
42. Press Release, GE Labeling Debate Continues in the U.S., Jun. 27, 2002,
http://www.organicconsumers.org/gefood/uslabels070302.cfm.
43. See infra, Part II.B.
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state law solution, this Comment concludes that a labeling requirement
should fall under federal law.44
I. THE ROLE OF LAW FROM FIELD TO TABLE
A. Introduction to Existing Regulatory Structure
1. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology
In 1986, the White House created a committee within the Office of
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to explore options for regulating
GMOs, then in their infancy.45 The resulting publication, the Coordinated
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology (Coordinated Framework),46
announced several opinions and decisions that would become foundational
principles, informing federal policy over the next several years.47 Most
important was the decision to utilize existing federal oversight agencies and
legal authorities rather than creating new ones for the specific purpose of
regulating GMOs.48 The Coordinated Framework took the approach that the
products of biotechnology should be regulated rather than the process
itself.49 It also laid the groundwork for the relationship between the USDA,
EPA, and FDA.50 USDA was tasked to focus on the potential threat to
existing agriculture, EPA on the environmental consequences of pesticides,
and FDA on the human health impacts.51 Using existing agencies for
oversight had the advantage of cost efficiency while also avoiding ―dilution
of relevant expertise and resources caused by the redistribution of those
resources across different departments.‖52 The disadvantages of using older
laws, which were written before the wide-ranging implications of newly
emerging biotechnology techniques could be anticipated,53 are explored in
the remainder of this Comment. As critics of the Coordinated Framework
44. See infra, Part II.C.
45. Alan McHughen & Stuart Smyth, US Regulatory System for Genetically Modified
[Genetically Modified Organism (GMO), rDNA or transgenic] Crop Cultivars, 6 PLANT
BIOTECH. J. 2, 4 (2007).
46. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (Jun. 26,
1986).
47. Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 15, at 441–42.
48. Lauren Zeichner, Product vs. Process: Two Labeling Regimes for Genetically Engineered
Foods and How They Relate to Consumer Preference, 27 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y J. 467,
477 (2004).
49. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302–303 (Jun.
26, 1986).
50. Id. at 23,303.
51. McHughen & Smyth, supra note 45, at 4.
52. Id.
53. Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 15, at 457.
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have expressed, ―Congress wrote many of the laws used to govern
biotechnology before scientists even knew that rDNA modifications were
possible, and the laws are not keeping pace with new technological
developments.‖54
2. USDA and EPA Authority
The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of USDA
regulates GM plants under authority granted by the Plant Protection Act of
2000.55 Its primary concern is the protection of agriculture from pests.56
According to a 2008 article, USDA has authorized over twelve thousand
field trials since the relevant regulation was first published in 1987.57 The
majority of common GM plants are approved for field trials, import, or
transportation between states under a simple notification procedure.58 This
process requires a letter to the agency demonstrating that the plant meets
particular threshold standards,59 such as not originating from a noxious
weed species.60 For proposed plants that do not meet such standards, there
is a permit process involving heightened scrutiny.61 In 1993, the USDA
implemented new regulations enabling GM plant producers to seek nonregulated status for certain plants considered safe based on prior review by
the agency.62 Obtaining non-regulated status involves an assessment of
potential environmental impacts of releasing the proposed plant and
additional requirements63 in order to comply with the Plant Protection Act64
and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).65
The EPA, on the other hand, regulates proposed GM plants under
authority of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA), first enacted in 1947.66 According to the agency, it regulates
pesticidal characteristics rather than the plants themselves.67 As a result,

54. Id.
55. Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C §§ 7701–7786 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
56. McHughen & Smyth, supra note 45, at 4–5.
57. Id. at 5.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 5–6 (describing the permitting process, which involves higher scrutiny than the
notification process and applies to genetically modified plants that don‘t meet the requirements for
notification).
62. Id. at 6.
63. Id.
64. Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7786 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
65. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370f (2006).
66. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2006).
67. McHughen & Smyth, supra note 45, at 9.
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proposed GM plants with pesticide or virus resistance (regardless of the
mechanism creating the resistance) have fallen under EPA review since
1995, when the agency started enforcing its initial regulations.68 In 2001,
the EPA began exempting certain categories of GM plants from its
oversight.69 EPA approval involves review of specified data ranging from
product characterization to toxicity in non-target species and soil, and
assessment of risks associated with gene escape.70
B. Regulating for Human Health and Safety: The Role of the FDA
1. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
The FDA is primarily responsible for regulating the safety of food
products in the American marketplace.71 Under the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA),72 which was initially passed in 1938, the agency has
authority to take legal action against producers of adulterated or misbranded
foods or impose labeling requirements.73 Adulterated food contains ―any
poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it injurious to
health.‖74 Misbranding, on the other hand, means advertising or labeling
that it is false or misleading.75 A misleading label fails to reveal facts that
are ―material‖ with respect to the representations made on the label or the
consequences that may result from using the product.76 Whether or not
genetic modification is a material fact under this rubric is the critical
inquiry.77 The FDA provided its response to this question in a pivotal 1992
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 9–11 (explaining the various categories of data required for submission as part
of the approval process and the concerns the EPA seeks to address by analyzing each type of
data).
71. Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 15, at 450; Zeichner, supra note 48, at 480.
72. Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 24 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
73. Zeichner, supra note 48, at 480–81. See also CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED
NUTRITION, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: VOLUNTARY LABELING
INDICATING WHETHER FOODS HAVE OR HAVE NOT BEEN DEVELOPED USING BIOENGINEERING
(draft) (2001),
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/Food
LabelingNutrition/ucm059098.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2011) (explaining that the FDA has
authority to impose labeling requirements under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act when the label
for an existing food product fails to provide certain ―material‖ information and describing
situations where specific labeling has typically been required, such as when the absence of the
information could pose a particular health risk).
74. 21 U.S.C. § 342 (a)(1) (2006).
75. Id. § 343(a)(1).
76. Id. § 321(n).
77. Emily Robertson, Note, Finding a Compromise in the Debate Over Genetically Modified
Food: An Introduction to a Model State Consumer Right-to-Know Act, 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
156, 159 (2003).
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policy statement, which announced that the agency did not consider the
process to be material.78 Rather, the FDA would regulate bioengineered
foods based on the end product, a policy consistent with the Coordinated
Framework‘s approach.79 The statement also clarified that labeling of GM
ingredients would not be required because they are considered ―generally
regarded as safe‖ (GRAS) and laid the groundwork for evaluating the safety
of proposed GM foods under the FDCA.80
Under these standards, adulterated foods, meaning ―foods containing
unexpected or novel substances, or usual substances falling outside normal
ranges for that kind of food,‖81 trigger FDA review, while unadulterated
foods do not, regardless of the process used to create them.82 GM foods that
have an identical or nearly identical composition as their traditional
counterparts (meaning ―composed of the same substances and in the same
amounts and relative proportions‖83) are considered unadulterated and
therefore do not require regulatory review.84 This criteria set is also known
as the substantial equivalence doctrine.85 Because most GM food products
qualify as unadulterated,86 they are subject to no more than the same
labeling requirements imposed on regular foods.87 Only when a proposed
GM product contains an additive that is neither GRAS nor a known allergen
will additional scrutiny— and labeling of the allergen under the FDCA or a
change of the product name to reflect its actual substance— be required.88
2. Voluntary FDA Consultation
Though there is no mandatory assessment process for unadulterated
foods, the FDA does offer consultations to evaluate the safety of new

78. Zeichner, supra note 48, at 482.
79. See infra, Part II.A.1.
80. Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 22,990–991 (May 29,
1992).
81. McHughen & Smyth, supra note 45, at 7.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. See also Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 15, at 450 (―In this context, ‗equivalent‘
means that there is no meaningful change in nutritional value or composition of the good and that
the new variety is as safe as the existing varieties already in commerce.‖).
85. Zeichner, supra note 48, at 481–82.
86. Id. at 482.
87. Robertson, supra note 77, at 160; Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 15, at 452 (―If the
nutritional content or potential allergens are the same, FDA will not require a label.‖).
88. See Robertson, supra note 77, at 160 (explaining the four limited circumstances under
which GMO labeling could be required according to current FDA policy); Farquhar & Meyer,
supra note 15, at 451 (noting that pre-market FDA approval is required for new genetically
modified plant varieties if the new product contains a food additive that has not been deemed
GRAS or if the plant ―contains a known allergen that it previously did not contain‖).
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foods.89 Unlike the reviews required by the USDA and EPA, this process is
informal and voluntary.90 It involves submission of data by the developer of
the proposed product to the FDA, which evaluates the product‘s nutritional
composition in comparison to its non-GM counterpart and whether it
contains any new toxins or allergens.91 In 1997, the FDA provided
procedural guidelines for compiling the relevant data.92 At the end of the
consultation, the agency does not approve or reject the product based on its
evaluation; instead, it develops a memo describing the product and
potentially relevant safety considerations.93 Some articles suggest that all
GM food products currently available to the public have been submitted for
such a consultation.94 There is no reliable way of verifying whether such
claims are accurate, however, because the consultation process is voluntary.
As a result, the FDA only has information on the products for which
manufacturers sought consultation, but there may be countless other
products on the market containing GMOs. Moreover, even if all products
have been subjected to consultation, the process does not impose stringent
requirements, nor does it prove that a new product is safe.95 In actuality, the
FDA memo represents nothing more than a conclusion that the product is
―as safe as its non-modified counterparts,‖ and this conclusion is based only
on the evidence reviewed, which is provided by the developer.96 It is also
noteworthy that under these voluntary consultation procedures, the FDA
has never rejected a proposed product or refused to allow its development.97
3. Case Law Upholding FDA Policy
The FDA‘s rejection of mandatory labeling for GMOs was upheld by a
federal district court in 2000.98 In Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala,99 a
89. McHughen & Smyth, supra note 45, at 8.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Consultation Procedures Under FDA‘s 1992 Statement of
Policy:
Foods
Derived
from
New
Plant
Varieties,
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/Biote
chnology/ucm096126.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2011).
93. McHughen & Smyth, supra note 45, at 9.
94. See, e.g., Jacobson, supra note 19, at 220 (noting in 2000 that all companies marketing
new GM foods had undergone voluntary consultation with the FDA).
95. McHughen and Smyth, supra note 45, at 9.
96. Id. (―It is worth noting that the FDA does not formally ‗approve‘ an application, or even
pass judgment on the safety or efficacy of the new product. Instead, the FDA issues a ‗memo‘
summarizing the features and how they may affect safety concerns. . . . The FDA does not
conclude that: ‗This new food/feed is safe.‘ Instead, it concludes, based on the evidence reviewed,
that: ‗This new food/feed is as safe as its non-modified counterparts.‘‖).
97. Rich, supra note 13, at 902 (noting in 2004 that the FDA had not refused to permit
development of a single GM product in the last ten years).
98. Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 179 (D.D.C. 2000).
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group of consumer advocacy and public interest organizations, along with
religious leaders, researchers, and other individuals, challenged the FDA‘s
policy of presuming GM food products to be GRAS under the FDCA.100
Legal grounds for their claims ranged from violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act (the 1992 policy statement did not undergo notice-andcomment)101 to violation of the First Amendment (based on the
impossibility of avoiding certain food products, if unlabeled, due to
religious objections)102 and a claim that the GRAS presumption was
arbitrary and capricious.103 The plaintiffs argued that the FDA had a duty to
consider consumer interest in labeling based on the FDCA and the special
requirements of people with allergies and religious limitations.104 The
Court found, however, that the FDA‘s scientific and technological expertise
was entitled to deference,105 in particular the agency‘s conclusion that
genetic engineering as a process does not constitute a material change to
food products.106 As the Court summarized,
Plaintiffs . . . fail to recognize that the determination that a
product differs materially from the type of product it
purports to be is a factual predicate to the requirement of
labeling. Only once materiality has been established may
the FDA consider consumer opinion to determine whether a
label is required to disclose a material fact.107
The Court also rejected the plaintiffs‘ constitutional and administrative law
arguments and ultimately awarded summary judgment to the FDA.108
The Alliance Court‘s holding has been interpreted as establishing that
the FDA‘s authority to mandate labeling of GM foods under current law is
extremely limited.109 Whether the Court‘s legal analysis is correct is a
matter of debate, and there are no other cases directly addressing the

99. Id. at 166.
100. Id. at 170.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 178.
105. Id. at 179 (―The FDA has already determined that, in general, rDNA modification does
not ‗materially‘ alter foods, and . . . this determination is entitled to deference.‖).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 181.
109. Zeichner, supra note 48, at 483. See also Emily Marden, Risk and Regulation: U.S.
Regulatory Policy on Genetically Modified Food and Agriculture, 44 B.C. L. REV. 733, 756
(2003) (―Ultimately, this decision made clear that critics of FDA's policy had very little legal
ground on which to stand. The case, however, did heighten public awareness of GM foods and
added to the perception that the government was not regulating these products.‖).
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issue.110 If this narrow interpretation of the FDA‘s statutory authority is
appropriate, then the only circumstances under which the agency could
properly require GMO labeling would be in the face of a known health or
safety risk.111 Yet there are many potential, unknown health risks posed by
GMOs that concern consumers and remain entirely unaddressed by the
FDA‘s policy of regulating the product only.112 Section II of this Comment
argues that such risks constitute sufficient justification for a labeling
requirement.113 In order to reach this end in light of the Alliance Court‘s
analysis and the FDA‘s current position, new federal statutory authority will
be necessary (or, in the absence of an overhaul to existing FDA policies like
substantial equivalence, amendments to the FDCA to create a pre-market
approval requirement that captures GM foods deemed ―unadulterated‖ are
needed).
II. MANDATORY LABELING OF FOOD PRODUCTS CONTAINING GMOS
SHOULD BE REQUIRED UNDER FEDERAL LAW
A. Mandatory Labeling Would Enable Consumers to Make Informed
Decisions in Light of the Known and Unknown Health Risks Associated
with GMOs
1. Allergens
One of the most serious health concerns associated with GMOs is the
possibility of introducing a food allergen that consumers would be unable to
anticipate in a particular product.114 There are multiple ways in which
rDNA technology creates this possibility, because it enables scientists to
transfer genes between unrelated plants115 and even kingdoms (e.g., the

110. See Moyer & Anway, supra note 21, at 701 (―Alliance for Bio-Integrity remains one of
the few reported judicial opinions to directly address the growing safety concerns associated with
GMOs.‖).
111. Zeichner, supra note 48, at 483.
112. Id. at 487 (―Consumers are concerned that the process of genetic engineering may create
unknown product characteristics that could pose risks in the long-term….Therefore consumer
concerns are not completely addressed in the case of GE foods, by informing them solely of
product-based risks.‖); Rich, supra note 13, at 904 (―Until new legislation aimed directly at the
regulation of genetically modified products is put into place, the FDA‘s choices are determining
the government‘s approach to the new technology, and may not reflect the concerns of the people
as represented by their legislators.‖).
113. See infra, Part II.B.
114. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706, 4709 (Jan. 18,
2001); Jacobson, supra note 19, at 220; McHughen & Smyth, supra note 45, at 8; Gao, supra note
1, at 304.
115. See Gao, supra note 1, at 297.
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insertion of an animal gene into a plant).116 First, the direct expression of
transferred allergenic proteins may occur, in which case the source of the
inserted gene is determinative of allergenicity.117 Because genetic
engineering increases the variety of proteins that can be used beyond those
available with traditional breeding, it increases the possibility of inserting a
protein that is an allergen.118 Second, the transfer could cause an indirect
effect by activating or de-activating genes adjacent to the insertion site and
thereby altering the existing allergenic proteins in the host plant.119
Notably, this kind of effect is also possible under traditional breeding
techniques.120 Third, because rDNA technology enables the expression of
proteins at higher concentrations than would normally be possible, ―these
higher concentrations may increase the potential for such proteins to be
allergenic.‖121
Under any of these mechanisms, known allergens do not pose a
significant threat because they can be identified, and they must be labeled
under the FDCA.122 It is the possibility of introducing an unknown allergen
(i.e., a protein that has not previously been identified as a common allergen)
that presents a serious health risk under a regulatory scheme that fails to
require testing for allergenic properties or labeling of GM ingredients,
which would at least alert consumers to the possibility of an unidentified
allergen‘s presence.123 As one author has stated, ―successful testing
ordinarily requires human volunteers, which is expensive. Although the
likelihood that any particular protein in a genetically modified food is an
allergen is relatively small, it is also unlikely that such an allergy would be
discovered without extensive testing.‖124 In a 2001 policy statement, the
FDA commented that it would most likely consider food containing an
unexpected allergen to be adulterated, and therefore the agency ―should be
made aware of the modification and have an opportunity to assess whether

116. Margaret Gilhooley, Reexamining the Labeling for Biotechnology in Foods: The Species
Connection, 82 NEB. L. REV. 1088, 1111 (2004).
117. Gao, supra note 1, at 304.
118. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4709.
119. Gao, supra note 1, at 304 (―As a result of transformation, neighboring genes at the site of
integration of the insert DNA may be turned off or turned on, resulting in changes in existing
proteins. Consequently, the possibility exists that the content of existing allergens of the plant
could be elevated or reduced.‖).
120. Id.
121. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4709.
122. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(w) (2006) (describing food labeling requirements for known
allergens).
123. Rich, supra note 13, at 894; see also Jacobson, supra note 19, at 220 (―An allergen newly
introduced into the food supply (say, from a bacterium) would be difficult to identify.‖).
124. Rich, supra note 13, at 894.
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and how the food could legally be marketed.‖125 The statement was part of
a proposed notice requirement, however, and the FDA never issued a final
ruling.126
One example of the allergy risks associated with genetic engineering
occurred when a U.S. company developed a nutritionally enhanced soybean
containing a protein from the Brazil nut.127 Scientists were aware that the
Brazil nut was allergenic to some individuals, but did not know which
specific protein caused the allergy.128 Initial research involving human
testing determined that the GM soybean expressed the allergenic protein;
therefore, the product was destroyed and never reached the commercial
marketplace.129 Though in this case, the allergen was caught prior to
causing any detrimental or potentially fatal consequences,130 the situation
serves as an example that the introduction of new allergens into the food
supply is more than a theoretical possibility. Had the producer of the
proposed product not discovered the problem, it would have been left to the
company‘s discretion whether or not to seek review by the FDA.131
Without a mandatory review and labeling requirement, there remains a
strong possibility that unknown allergens will be introduced into the food
supply in the future.
2. Toxins
Genetic engineering also presents a risk of creating new toxins or
altering levels of existing ones.132 As with allergens, the effect may be
direct or indirect.133 A common example of the direct effect is Bacillus
thuringiensis (Bt) plants, an early commercial product of rDNA technology
that introduced genes from soil bacterium into host crops like corn in order
to give them insecticidal properties.134 There is no definitive research
proving that the consumption of such plants is safe or unsafe.135 Though
studies thus far have not demonstrated any short-term risks,136 the products
have not been on the market long enough to make an analysis of their long125. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4710.
126. Gilhooly, supra note 116, at 1097–98.
127. Gao, supra note 1, at 304.
128. Id.
129. See id (noting that all field testing was stopped and all plant material destroyed).
130. See id (noting that the product never moved beyond field testing).
131. See supra, Part I.B.2.
132. Gao, supra note 1, at 299–300.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 301. More specifically, the transferred gene causes the host plant to express
particular endotoxins that repel common insects. Id.
135. Rich, supra note 13, at 894–95.
136. Id.
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term effects feasible.137 The widespread use of Bt crops has caused some in
the scientific community to hypothesize about the potential dangers
associated with higher exposure levels, particularly for immunocompromised individuals.138 Genetic engineering may also produce an
indirect effect on levels of plant toxins because ―the introduction of new
genes may increase or decrease the expression of the existing proteins or
enzymes, which in turn results in the change of other substances in
plants.‖139 Finally, the process itself can have the indirect effect of
increasing (or decreasing) the amount of toxins produced by a plant, if, for
instance, a transgene is inserted into a host gene that plays a role in
regulating toxin levels.140 Because the most common scientific methods
used for genetic modification involve random insertion, there is a distinct
possibility of this occurrence.141
In 1990, a genetically engineered version of the supplement tryptophan
was taken off the market after scientists discovered that it was responsible
for producing deadly contaminants.142 The mistake cost at least thirty-six
Americans their lives, and caused 1500 people to develop a permanently
disabling blood disorder known as eosinophilia-myalgia syndrome
(EMS).143 The New York Times reported that the Japanese chemical
company responsible for marketing the supplement has paid billions in
damages to victims of the incident.144 Although the genetic modification
137. Id. at 895.
138. Id.
139. Gao, supra note 1, at 299–300. See also Jacobson, supra note 19, at 220 (―Levels of
naturally occurring toxins, such as solanine, might accidentally be increased in genetically
modified plants.‖).
140. Gao, supra note 1, at 300. See also JEFFREY M. SMITH, GENETIC ROULETTE: THE
DOCUMENTED HEALTH RISKS OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS 84–6 (2007) (discussing the
alteration in levels of plant metabolites that results from gene insertion and providing examples of
studies demonstrating increased toxin production by genetically engineered tobacco, yeast,
potatoes, and wheat).
141. Gao, supra note 1, at 300; Robertson, supra note 77, at 168 (―Techniques, such as directly
inserting genes using a ‗gene gun‘ or transferring DNA through bacteria, do not provide great
control over where the genetic material is inserted.‖). For further discussion of the disruptive
effect of randomly inserting transgenes into host plant DNA, see Smith, supra note 140, at 64–5.
142. Denise Grady, Dietary Supplement Found to Be Contaminated, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 1, 1998,
at F8. See also THE CAMPAIGN TO LABEL GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS, GENETICALLY
ENGINEERED FOODS AND YOUR HEALTH (2003) (on file with author) (describing the dietary
supplement as ―mutated tryptophan‖ and asserting that it ―wreaked havoc‖ in the form of death
and disability before the FDA recalled it).
143. See, e.g., Genetically-Modified Foods: The Silent Killer, GM Tryptophan-EMS-Killed 37
and
Permanently
Disabled
1500
People,
http://todayyesterdayandtomorrow.wordpress.com/2007/06/09/gm-tryptophan-ems-killed-37-andpermanently-disabled-1500-people/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2011). The disorder is known as EMS
because it causes elevated counts of eosinophils, a type of white blood cell. Grady, supra note
142.
144. Grady, supra note 142.
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process was never definitively proven to be the source of the toxin
production, substantial evidence indicates that it likely was.145 Most
notably, some experts have blamed the lack of a labeling requirement—
which made it impossible to discern whether consumers had ingested a
conventional or GE version of the supplement— for the months-long delay
in discovering the source of the toxins.146 Had there been a labeling
requirement, the FDA would arguably have been able to isolate the source
of the contaminant more quickly and save lives or prevent disability as a
result.
3. Antibiotic Resistance
The third known health risk that may be associated with genetic
engineering is antibiotic resistance.147 It is common practice to use
antibiotic-resistant marker genes as part of the procedure so scientists can
determine whether they have successfully inserted the target gene.148 As
one author has summarized, ―Some scientists fear that the quality [of
antibiotic resistance] could be transferred either to humans who consume
the plant, or to naturally occurring pathogenic bacteria, thus reducing the
therapeutic effects of antibiotics taken for medical reasons.‖149 The serious
consequences of antibiotic resistance have been well documented in recent
years, due to the media spotlight on so-called superbugs, such as
Extensively-Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis (XDR TB) and Methicillinresistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA).150 Whether or not genetic

145. See JEFFREY M. SMITH, SEEDS OF DECEPTION 107–25 (2003) (describing the available
evidence, scientific and media coverage surrounding the incident, and the FDA‘s resistance to
experts‘ efforts to link the genetic engineering process with the fatal toxins).
146. John B. Fagan, Physicians & Scientists for Responsible Application of Science &
Technology, Tryptophan Summary (Nov. 1997), http://www.psrast.org/jftrypt.htm.
147. Rich, supra note 13, at 895. Antibiotic resistance has become a serious public health
threat in recent decades. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, FAST FACTS: FACTS
ABOUT ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE, http://www.cdc.gov/getsmart/antibiotic-use/fast-facts.html (last
visited Apr. 19, 2011). It is thought to result from the misuse and overuse of antibiotics to combat
common bacterial infections in human and veterinary medicine. Id. As a result of this growing
phenomenon, bacterial illnesses are posing more serious health consequences as the underlying
bacteria that cause them become resistant to the frontline antibiotics previously used for treatment.
Id.
148. Rich, supra note 13, at 895.
149. Id. See also THE CAMPAIGN TO LABEL GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS, supra note
142 (describing the use of antibiotics as markers in genetic engineering and the risk that these
markers may increase antibiotic resistance).
150. TASK GROUP ON PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, EUROPEAN FEDERATION OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY, ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE MARKERS IN GENETICALLY MODIFIED (GM) CROPS
2 (2001), available at http://www.efb-central.org/images/uploads/AntibioticRM_English.pdf
(―Today resistance to antibiotics is so widespread that some of the first generation of antibiotics
are of no use anymore. Multiple antibiotic resistance in pathogenic strains of Staphylococcus and
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engineering practices contribute substantially to antibiotic resistance is not
entirely resolved and merits focused scientific study.151 In the meantime,
the possibility is sufficient to support a labeling requirement, so consumers
who wish to avoid GM products due to this uncertainty are afforded the
opportunity to do so.
4. Unknown Long-Term Health Risks
Uncertainty is the bottom line for many consumers. There is no
determinative research on the long-term effects of eating genetically
engineered foods.152 They have not been on the market long enough for
scientists to conduct longitudinal studies or even studies that take into
account one human lifespan.153 Additionally, because labeling has not been
required to date, future researchers face the potentially insurmountable task
of creating control groups that have never been exposed to GM products—
an element that is, at best, difficult to determine when consumers cannot
distinguish between conventional and GM foods.154 As one author framed

Mycobacterium tuberculosis, especially in hospitals, is of particular concern to the medical
community.‖).
151. See id. at 4 (acknowledging that antibiotic resistant markers have not necessarily been
proven safe and noting that alternative markers are under investigation but will require additional
safety studies prior to commercialization).
152. Rich, supra note 13, at 901 (―To some extent, the question of how safe or dangerous
genetically modified crops are is still unanswerable, due to a lack of studies on the long-term
effects of GMOs on both human health and the environment.‖); id. at 900 (―At the very least, the
cumulative force of the research is indeterminate of the risk posed by GMOs to human health.‖).
153. See id. at 900 (indicating that there is existing research concluding GMOs are safe for
human health, but only in the ―short term,‖ and characterizing research suggestive of health risks
as ―speculative‖). GM plants first became available on the commercial market in 1996. Gao, supra
note 1, at 298. Therefore an individual who has been consuming GMOs since 1996 has been
exposed to them for only fifteen years, whereas the average life expectancy in the U.S. is about
78. Melonie Heron et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2006, 57 NAT‘L VITAL STAT. REP. 1 (2009),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr57/nvsr57_14.pdf. Furthermore, there has
been an observed tendency for the biotechnology industry to produce studies concluding that GM
products are safe, ―while most of the risk-finding studies are conducted by private researchers.‖
Rich, supra note 13, at 900.
154. There is no surefire way to ensure that a study participant has entirely avoided foods
containing GM ingredients, but participants who claim to exclusively consume certified organic
foods would be a starting point, since foods that are certified and labeled as organic cannot contain
GM ingredients. See Zeichner, supra note 48, at 488 (―The USDA organic label was created in
accordance with organic principles that promote awareness of the impacts that production of food
has on the environment, the animal world and society as a whole. After much consideration, the
USDA decided that genetic engineering was not consistent with these ideals and concluded that
the organic label should not be used on foods that have gone through GE processes.‖). On the
other hand, this exclusion applies only to the process of genetic engineering. Therefore under
USDA policy, ―the unintended presence of [GM] products does not affect the status of an organic
product or operations.‖ Rich, supra note 13, at 911 (citing National Organic Program, 7 C.F.R. §
205 (2003)). In other words, a food that is certified organic may unintentionally contain GMOs
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the issue: ―The introduction of GMO products into the United States food
supply serves as an experiment, albeit performed on unwilling subjects and
without following scientific method.‖155 An FDA report in 2000 revealed
that consumers are concerned about ―the potential for unknown long-term
effects of the technology, in particular health effects.‖156 This attitude, also
known as the hazard model, is informed by comparisons to other
agricultural technologies (e.g., growth hormones) and the belief that the
government does not adequately consider consumer interests.157
One example of an unknown but potentially long-term health risk is
the possibility that genetic modification could somehow alter the level of
existing nutrients in the host plant or their ability to be absorbed by the
human body.158 This prospect, like producing new allergens or toxins,
arises as a result of the random insertion of the transgene.159 Though an
alteration in the level of most nutrients would not typically have fatal
consequences, it could nonetheless be seriously injurious to health in
situations where certain populations rely on a particular GM food as their
main source of a specific nutrient.160 Assume, for example, that a particular
neighborhood with a large Latino population is a major consumer of corn
and depends on this dietary staple as its primary source of Vitamin B1
(thiamin). Because there is no labeling requirement, this group has no way
of determining whether it is consuming conventional or GM corn. If the
GM corn contains lowered values of vitamin B1, and this population is
consuming mostly GM corn, then negative health consequences may ensue.
Memory loss and Alzheimer‘s disease are associated with a lack of
acetylcholine,161 and the synthesis of this neurotransmitter requires
sufficient amounts of Vitamin B1.162 What‘s more, the affected individuals
would not be aware of the source of the problem and, therefore, would not
be empowered to make adjustments in their purchasing and eating habits to
account for this potential impact.

due to pollen drift. Id. This situation aggravates the difficulty of identifying a group of individuals
for research purposes who have never consumed GMOs.
155. Rich, supra note 13, at 901.
156. Zeichner, supra note 48, at 485 (citing ALAN S. LEVY & BRENDA M. DERBY, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., REPORT ON CONSUMER FOCUS GROUPS ON BIOTECHNOLOGY (2000)).
157. Id at 486 (citing ALAN S. LEVY & BRENDA M. DERBY, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
REPORT ON CONSUMER FOCUS GROUPS ON BIOTECHNOLOGY (2000)).
158. Rich, supra note 13, at 895.
159. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. For further discussion, see Gao, supra note 1,
at 306 (describing the four ways in which an alteration of nutrient levels could potentially occur).
160. Gao, supra note 1, at 306.
161. The World‘s Healthiest Foods, Corn,
http://www.whfoods.com/genpage.php?tname=foodspice&dbid=90 (last visited Apr. 19, 2011).
162. Id.
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Opponents of GMO labeling point out that the same problem can
occur using conventional breeding techniques and that the issue is
addressed by the nutritional analysis GM foods undergo.163 This FDA
consultation is entirely voluntary, however,164 so there is no way of
ensuring that a significant change in the nutritional profile of a GM plant
would be identified. The fact that genetic engineering can now be used to
improve the nutritional profile of certain foods165 increases the odds that a
particular population will rely solely on a GM food for a particular
nutrient.166 For instance, a variety of rice with enhanced levels of Vitamin
A (also known as Golden Rice) is currently under development,167 with the
goal of distributing it to developing countries where large numbers of
people suffer from the debilitating effects of Vitamin A deficiency, such as
blindness.168 Only if the developer of Golden Rice chooses to undergo
voluntary consultation with the FDA will an independent compositional
analysis be performed to evaluate the nutrients contained in the new
product. Otherwise, it is entirely possible that a critical nutrient in the rice,
other than Vitamin A, could potentially be lowered as a result of the genetic
modification process; thus, a population that mainly eats rice would suffer
any health consequences associated with a reduction of that nutrient.
B. Policy Arguments Support a Mandatory Labeling Requirement for
GMOs
As an initial premise, expecting the developers of GM foods to selfpolice when they stand to benefit significantly from the commercial
availability of these products creates a conflict of interest.169 Not only is
future profit at stake, but the biotechnology industry has also invested
billions of dollars in research and development,170 and therefore, has an
obvious interest in promoting the widespread use of GMOs whether or not

163. Gao, supra note 1, at 306 (―The potential alteration in nutrient composition of new GM
varieties is addressed through characterization of the inserted gene and compositional analysis of
the GM foods.‖).
164. See supra, Part I.B.2.
165. Gao, supra note 1, at 306.
166. See id. (noting that the greatest incidence of Vitamin A deficiency is found in South and
Southeast Asia because rice is the primary food in these regions, and it does not produce Vitamin
A).
167. Id. at 306–07.
168. Gregory Jaffe, The Next Generation, 26 ENV. FORUM 38, 40 (2009); Baris Karapinar &
Michelangelo Temmerman, Benefiting from Biotechnology: Pro-Poor Intellectual Property Rights
and Public-Private Partnerships, 27 BIOTECH. L. REP. 189, 191 (2008).
169. THE CAMPAIGN TO LABEL GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS, supra note 142.
170. Rich, supra note 13, at 909 (―The biotech food industry has not only spent billions of
dollars on research and development, but has also spent millions in fighting labeling initiatives.‖).
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they are safe.171 A labeling requirement would level this uneven playing
field by putting the burden of proving the safety of GMOs on those in a
position to gain from them.172 Such a requirement would ―encourage
biotech companies to ‗sell‘ the consumers on their products, rather than
slipping the products into the market without notice to consumers.‖173
Otherwise, American consumers bear the potential risks and costs
associated with this technology.174
In a similar vein, a labeling requirement would increase consumer
awareness of the issue and promote public debate.175 It would also highlight
the need for and encourage additional research on the safety of GM
foods.176 Considering the deadly tryptophan incident in 1990, for example,
begs the question whether a labeling requirement would have inspired the
manufacturer to conduct more extensive testing of its product prior to
marketing. Labeling would enable consumers to correlate GM products
with their corporate manufacturers;177 thus, it would encourage FDA
consultation and additional research because the reputation of a company‘s
name brand would be on the line.
The American public overwhelmingly supports mandated labeling.178
In 2000, the FDA convened consumer focus groups on the topic of GMO
labeling in four states selected to reflect cultural and geographic
diversity.179 The study found that almost all participants favored a labeling
requirement,180 and, additionally, that they expressed shock and ―outrage‖
upon learning that GMOs were already available to the public.181 An ABC
poll the following year concluded that ninety-three percent of respondents
believed there should be a federal labeling requirement for all GE foods.182
Also in 2001, the Center for Science in the Public Interest found that about
171. Id. (―It would seem that [the biotech industry has] bet the proverbial bank on the success
of their products, and thus [has] more than just a glancing interest in the widespread public
acceptance of genetically modified foods.‖).
172. THE CAMPAIGN TO LABEL GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS, supra note 142.
173. Rich, supra note 13, at 915.
174. Id. at 909.
175. THE CAMPAIGN TO LABEL GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS, supra note 142.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See infra, notes 180–87 and accompanying text.
179. See Megan Carter Judge, Consumers and Benefits of Genetically Modified Vegetables 30
(Mar. 2010) (unpublished M.S. dissertation, California Polytechnic State University) (on file with
author) (reporting the details of the FDA focus group study, which is no longer available from
FDA).
180. See id. at 32 (―Participants were in agreement on the value of a ‗mere disclosure‘
labeling.‖).
181. Id. at 33.
182. Gary Langer, Behind the Label: Many Skeptical of Bio-Engineered Food,
ABCNEWS.COM (2001), http://abcnews.go.com/sections/scitech/DailyNews/poll010619.html.
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two-thirds of its survey participants wanted GMO labeling.183 Additional
studies by the Pew Initiative and Novartis, a major producer of GM foods,
reported that seventy-five percent and ninety-three percent of respondents,
respectively, supported a labeling requirement.184 Consumer support for
stricter regulations is not just a thing of the past; more recently, there was a
strong backlash against President Bush‘s proposals to loosen regulation of
GM crops.185 In March 2009, a group of eighty-two public interest,
environmental advocacy, and farming organizations186 sent a letter to the
Secretary of the USDA demanding that the agency provide stricter
oversight with more public input and freeze approvals of GM crops pending
such changes.187 While the attitude of the public may not be based on
scientific knowledge, its buying power keeps the biotechnology industry in
business; to overlook public outcry is overly paternalistic from a policy
standpoint and undermines the principles of democratic government,
particularly in light of the industry‘s unmatched lobbying power.188
Not only does the public want to know what it is eating,189 but there
is also a substantial movement arguing that the public has a right to
know.190 Consumers may wish to avoid GMOs for many reasons, whether
due to concern over potential health risks, dietary limitations, or religious or

183. Gregory A. Jaffe, Center for Science in the Public Interest, Labeling Genetically Modified
Foods:
Communicating
or
Creating
Confusion?
(Jun.
27,
2002),
http:www.cspinet.org/biotech/pew-forum.html.
184. Zeichner, supra note 48, at 485 (citing Compilation and Analysis of Public Opinion Polls
on
Genetically
Engineered
Foods,
CTR.
FOR
FOOD
SAFETY,
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/facts&issues/polls.html (Feb. 1, 2000)).
185. See Press Release, Ctr. for Food Safety, Diverse Farmer and Public Interest Groups Urge
USDA to Freeze Approvals of Genetically Engineered Crops (Mar. 20, 2009),
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/2009/03/20/diverse-farmer-and-public-interest-groups-urgeusda-to-freeze-approvals-of-genetically-engineered-crops.
186. Signatories to the letter included groups as diverse as the California Farm Stewardship
Association, Farm Aid, Health Care Without Harm, the National Cooperative Grocers
Association, the Rodale Institute, the Sierra Club, the Union of Concerned Scientists, and small
seed companies and family farms, among others. Letter from Eighty-Two Public Interest Groups
to Tom Vilsack, Secretary, U.S. Dep‘t of Agric. (Mar. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/pubs/Final_APHIS-20082003%20Supplemental%20Comments.pdf.
187. Id.
188. Rich, supra note 13, at 906 (―To ignore mass public concern is irresponsible, and denotes
a paternalistic approach to public policy. . . . The public‘s ‗right to know‘ might better be thought
of as a ‗right to be heard.‘ And listened to. This is the essence of a representative government, a
fact not lost to the biotech industry, which has taken full advantage of their lobbying power to
ensure technology-friendly regulations.‖).
189. See supra, notes 180–87 and accompanying text.
190. See Rich, supra note 13, at 904–09 (describing the consumer right-to-know argument
within the context of consumer choice and the biotech industry‘s desire to avoid a labeling
requirement).
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moral restrictions.191 Vegetarians, for instance, ―may find unacceptable the
presence of a non-vegetable constituent even in the form of a gene, which
only expresses agronomic characteristics useful for growth.‖192 Because
GMOs are found in a vast majority of grocery store products,193 it would be
difficult, if not impossible, for such consumers to avoid them altogether.194
Without labeling, their only choice is to grow their own food or purchase
only certified organic food, options that would not be feasible for many
Americans based on the land and other resources required for the former
and the higher cost and limited availability of the latter.195 From a policy
perspective, these options are so unrealistic that people are essentially not
afforded a choice at all.
What‘s more, individuals cannot identify food products containing
GM ingredients and are therefore excluded not only from taking personal
responsibility for their health in this regard, but also from expressing a
preference that should be reflected in the marketplace.196 As many experts
have pointed out, the industry‘s argument is contrary to the very concept of
consumer choice: ―Without labeling, no choice can be made, and thus no
preference can be conveyed to the manufacturers. The fear of the biotech
industry may not be that irrational choices will be made by consumers, but
that consumers will legitimately reject their products.‖197 Some ardent
proponents of this approach go so far as to argue that the lack of a labeling
requirement constitutes consumer deception in cases where a GM food is so
different from its conventional counterpart that it cannot be understood to
be the same product.198
C. The Solution Should Come Under Federal Rather than State Law to
Achieve Uniformity and Circumvent Legal Challenges that Would Most
Likely Make State Legislative Responses Ineffective
A mandatory labeling scheme should be implemented under federal
law in order to avoid the constitutional problems that have plagued state
efforts to enact such laws thus far. State responses to biotechnology issues

191. Robertson, supra note 77, at 170; Gilhooley, supra note 116, at 1112.
192. Gilhooley, supra note 116, at 1112.
193. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
194. Rich, supra note 13, at 907.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 908.
197. Id.
198. Gilhooley, supra note 116, at 1103–04 (―The important question is whether the consumer
would understand a food to be different, and not what they thought it to be, if the food
incorporated a gene from a different plant without a disclosure.‖).
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have varied widely: a 2007 article reported that nine states199 at that time
had labeling laws (mandatory or voluntary), while twenty-two200 gave tax
breaks or other funding to attract biotech producers.201 At the other end of
the spectrum, dozens of bills have been introduced at the state level
proposing to ban particular biotech products or requiring a permit to import
or commercially release them within the state.202 Where states have passed
mandatory GMO labeling requirements, the courts have not upheld them.203
A frequently cited example, which presents similar concerns though it is not
precisely parallel, is Vermont‘s mandatory labeling of milk products
containing the growth hormone rBST.204 In 1995, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit granted an injunction to the dairy industry against
enforcement of the statute.205 The dairy producers successfully argued that
it violated the First Amendment.206
Preemption by federal food labeling laws may also pose an
insurmountable challenge. It is important to distinguish labeling from food
safety, which the Supreme Court considers to be a local issue.207 States are
free (to some extent) to impose more rigorous restrictions on food safety
than the FDCA does,208 and courts typically set the threshold at explicit

199. Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 15, at 459 (citing National Conference of State
Legislatures,
Biotechnology
Statutes
Chart,
Jul.
7,
2007,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/agri/biotchlg.htm). The nine states with labeling laws are: Alaska,
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia and Wisconsin. Id.
200. The states with financial breaks for biotechnology producers include: Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Texas. Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 15, at 459 (citing National
Conference
of
State
Legislatures,
Biotechnology
Statutes
Chart,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/agri/biotchlg.htm).
201. Id.
202. Id. (citing National Conference of State Legislatures, Biotechnology Statutes Chart,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/agri/biotchlg.htm) (―California is the only state to have an outright
ban on a biotechnology product, but twenty-nine bills have been introduced seeking to ban some
aspect of biotechnology, and nine states require a permit either for the importation or release of
genetically-modified products.‖).
203. See Robertson, supra note 77, at 163–65 (describing successful constitutional challenges
to state statutes mandating labeling of GMOs, based on Commerce Clause and First Amendment
claims).
204. Id. at 163–64.
205. Int‘l Dairy Foods Ass‘n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1996).
206. Id. at 72–73. The dairy manufacturers also made an argument based on Commerce Clause
grounds, but the Court did not reach this claim because it found that they were entitled to an
injunction based on the First Amendment claim. Id. at 70.
207. Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 15, at 468.
208. Id. at 469 (―The definition of adulterated food in the FDCA is considered a floor for food
safety regulations, not a ceiling. Therefore, under the FDCA, states may place additional
restrictions on food production produced using biotechnology. . . . Short of a ban, states may
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preemption or conflict preemption as a requirement for blocking state action
in this area.209 For food labeling, however, there is clear evidence of
Congressional intent to preempt state regulation.210 The Nutrition Labeling
and Education Act (NLEA)211 is the impetus behind the common nutrition
facts panel found on grocery store shelves around the country.212 This
information is required under the first section of the NLEA.213 The second
section of the statute involves voluntary claims that expressly or implicitly
relate to any of the nutrients on the requisite nutrition facts (e.g., ―high in
fiber‖).214
The NLEA addresses preemption explicitly.215 First, states may not
impose food labeling requirements that are not identical to those under the
first section of the NLEA.216 An exception to this provision leaves states
free to regulate nutrient labels for food sold in restaurants rather than retail
locations like grocery stores.217 Second, states are prohibited from
regulating the voluntary health claims falling under the second section of
the statute, even when they are made on food sold by restaurants.218 The
FDA posits that information on biotechnology procedures used to create a
food product does not constitute nutritional information that meets
disclosure requirements; therefore, ―it is unlikely it will find that the general
public of a state has a particular need for the information; and thus, it is
unlikely that the FDA will grant an exemption for mandatory labeling.‖219
Even if an exemption were granted, Constitutional objections—namely the

regulate food safety so long as those regulations do not contradict federal regulations, and food
producers can comply with both sets of rules.‖).
209. Id. at 468 (―Because food safety is generally a local concern, courts require either explicit
preemption or conflict preemption in order to preempt a state or local regulation.‖) (citing Fla.
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144 (1963)).
210. Id.
211. 21 U.S.C. §§ 343(q)-(r) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
212. Id. § 343(q)(1).
213. Id.
214. Id. § 343(r)(1)(A); id. § 343(r)(1)(B).
215. Id. § 343-1(a)(4); id. § 343-1(a)(5).
216. Id. 343-1(a)(4).
217. N.Y. State Rest. Ass‘n v. N.Y. City Bd. Of Health, 509 F. Supp 2d 351, 357 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).
218. Id. at 358.
219. Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 15, at 469–70 (citing CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED
NUTRITION, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: VOLUNTARY LABELING
INDICATING WHETHER FOODS HAVE OR HAVE NOT BEEN DEVELOPED USING BIOENGINEERING
(draft)
(2001),
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/Food
LabelingNutrition/ucm059098.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2011).
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commercial free speech rights of GMO producers under the First
Amendment—are likely to impede state litigation.220
Even without the constitutional obstacles facing state legislatures in
this arena, state legislation would not be the appropriate forum for imposing
a labeling regime.221 States lack the resources to conduct adequate research
on the human health impacts of GM products, and as a consequence, state
officials feel this responsibility should fall on the shoulders of the federal
government.222 A 2004 survey by the Pew Foundation suggested that states
operate under conflicting influences when it comes to biotechnology: if
their regulations are too strict, they could drive biotech dollars to other
states, but if they are not strict enough, the health and safety of their
residents could be at risk.223 The Pew survey also revealed that state
officials are primarily concerned with the local impacts of biotechnology,
such as economic issues facing local farmers.224 Considering these
challenges to state labeling legislation in the aggregate, as one author has
concluded, ―If Congress wishes to treat biotechnology differently from
conventional crops, and either grant states greater or lesser power to
regulate the field, it must act and specify that desire. Until then, courts will
likely view the inaction as satisfaction with the currently [sic] regulatory
scheme, including that scheme‘s preemption.‖225
D. Voluntary Labeling Is Not a Viable Alternative and Would Most
Likely Violate FDA Policy
One option for food producers is voluntary labeling to express the
absence of GMOs (e.g., ―GMO free‖) or indicate that biotechnology has not

220. For further discussion, see id. at 470. For additional discussion of preemption by the
NLEA, see Robertson, supra note 77, at 165–68.
221. See infra notes 222–25 and accompanying text.
222. Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 15, at 458 (citing MICHAEL R. TAYLOR ET AL.,
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, TENDING THE FIELDS: STATE & FEDERAL ROLES IN THE
OVERSIGHT
OF
GENETICALLY
MODIFIED
CROPS
22
(2004),
available
at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Food_and_Biotechnology/Te
nding_Fields_Biotech1204.pdf).
223. Id. (citing MICHAEL R. TAYLOR ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, TENDING THE
FIELDS: STATE & FEDERAL ROLES IN THE OVERSIGHT OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS 26
(2004),
available
at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Food_and_Biotechnology/Te
nding_Fields_Biotech1204.pdf).
224. Id. (citing MICHAEL R. TAYLOR ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, TENDING THE
FIELDS: STATE & FEDERAL ROLES IN THE OVERSIGHT OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS 22
(2004), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Food_and_Biotechnology/Te
nding_Fields_Biotech1204.pdf).
225. Id. at 474.
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been used in the development of a particular food product.226 There are two
reasons that voluntary labeling is problematic and does not offer a sufficient
solution for notifying consumers about GM ingredients. First, there is a
likelihood that many voluntary labels violate FDA regulations,227 although
the FDA has not expressly prohibited them.228 The agency issued a policy
statement in 2001 indicating that claims like ―GMO free‖ may be
misleading, and therefore barred under the FDCA,229 because a threshold
level of GM components in food items has not been established, and such a
label may imply that foods containing GMOs are inferior.230 Additional
guidance from the FDA provided examples of acceptable claims that would
―avoid or minimize‖ an implication of inferiority, such as ―we do not use
ingredients that were produced using biotechnology.‖231 On the other hand,
it described in detail the many ways in which a claim could be
misleading.232 For instance, even when it is true that a particular ingredient
was not genetically modified, such a statement would be misleading ―if
consumers believe that the entire product or a larger portion of it than is
actually the case is free of bioengineered material.‖233 Another example of
a potentially misleading statement is a claim that an item or ingredient is
not genetically modified, when there has never been a GM version of that
item or ingredient available on the market.234 This guidance is likely to be
confusing to food manufacturers and therefore overly burdensome to
interpret and implement,235 especially considering the potential costs and
legal exposure that result from violating the FDCA.236
226. Id. at 452.
227. Robertson, supra note 77, at 161.
228. Id. (―Even voluntary disclosure of the presence or absence of GMOs on labels may violate
FDA regulations.‖); see also Chen, supra note 18, at 1583 (describing in detail the conflict
between voluntary labeling and the FDCA).
229. Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or Have Not Been Developed Using
Bioengineering, 66 Fed. Reg. 4839, 4840 (Jan. 18, 2001).
230. Id.
231. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE
FOR INDUSTRY: VOLUNTARY LABELING INDICATING WHETHER FOODS HAVE OR HAVE NOT
BEEN
DEVELOPED
USING
BIOENGINEERING
(draft)
(2001),
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/Food
LabelingNutrition/ucm059098.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2011).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Robertson, supra note 77, at 161 (―The FDA has given confusing signals regarding
whether producers can voluntarily and legally use labels specifically noting that they do not use
GMO ingredients.‖); id. at 163 (―Until this issue is litigated, non-GMO food producers will
increase their exposure to law suits by continuing to market products with labels referring to
health or environmental issues and the absence of GMO ingredients.‖).
236. See 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (2006) (describing the criminal penalties for violating the FDCA);
id. § 335b(a) (describing civil penalties for violating the FDCA).
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The second obvious problem is that this type of labeling is purely
voluntary,237 so it remains difficult or impossible to distinguish most GM
products from their unlabeled, non-GM counterparts. In light of the strong
possibility that many voluntary labels (even those considered appropriate by
the FDA) will be misleading or confusing to the public, they may even
undermine the goal of empowering consumers with accurate
information.238 Such a system leaves consumers vulnerable to exaggerated
labeling claims that play into popular suspicions of biotechnology.239 From
another perspective, a voluntary labeling scheme may also be unfair in that
it places the costs associated with labeling on the producers of non-GMO
foods, whereas the producers of GMOs are the ones introducing a new
technology that deviates from the established status quo.240 Some states
have successfully steered clear of this issue by integrating biotechnology
considerations into their organic labeling regulations, such as requiring that
certified organic foods be produced with little or no genetic
modification.241
CONCLUSION
At the heart of the controversy surrounding GMOs is this question: is
it appropriate for the government to presume GM foods are safe and allow
the biotechnology industry to market them until proven otherwise, or should
the onus of demonstrating their safety be on the companies who stand to
profit from them?242 Though no studies definitively prove that GMOs are
harmful, no studies prove that they are safe either.243 Considering the
possibility of serious health and safety risks,244 we should err on the side of
adopting an overly cautious approach to regulation. As history has
demonstrated, if any of the potential risks actualize, the result could be

237. See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
238. Jaffe, supra note 183 (―Much of the information provided in a voluntary system will take
advantage of consumers‘ concerns and lack of knowledge about biotechnology, instead of
providing accurate and non-disparaging information.‖).
239. Id; see also Chen, supra note 18, at 1585–86 (―Fear about food is one of the most deeply
seated forms of behavioral protection against the natural world. . . . It is precisely here, where food
comes into contact with notions of good and evil, that the classic regulatory state must take its
stand.‖).
240. Rich, supra note 13, at 909 (―While it may be in the industry‘s best interest to not label,
the alternative is that those who do not want to eat genetically modified foods will bear the cost.
Whether or not such an expectation is fair to the concerned consumer remains in doubt.‖).
241. Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 15, at 471.
242. See supra, Part B.
243. Rich, supra note 13, at 906 (―The studies done on genetically modified crops are at the
very least inconclusive in terms of impact upon human health and the environment. Enough doubt
remains to substantiate legitimate concern.‖).
244. See supra, Part II.A.
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irrevocable damage.245 American consumers should not have to shoulder
this burden. In the absence of mandatory FDA review, a federal labeling
requirement would provide an appropriate middle ground by enabling
consumers to make their own choices based on the information available.246

245. Robertson, supra note 77, at 170.
246. See supra, Part II.B.

